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THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HOW MACHINE
INTELLIGENCE WILL TRANSFORM THE ROLE
OF LAWYERS IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL
SERVICES
John O. McGinnis* & Russell G. Pearce**
INTRODUCTION
Law is an information technology—a code that regulates social life. In
our age, the machinery of information technology is growing exponentially
in power, not only in hardware, but also in the software capacity of the
programs that run on computers. As a result, the legal profession faces a
great disruption. Information technology has already had a huge impact on
traditional journalism, causing revenues to fall by about a third and
employment to decrease by about 17,000 people in the last eight years1 and
very substantially decreasing the market value of newspapers. Because law
consists of more specialized and personalized information, the disruption is
beginning in law after journalism. But, its effects will be as wide ranging.
Indeed they may ultimately be greater, because legal information is
generally of higher value, being central to the protection of individuals’
lives and property.
The disruption has already begun.
In discovery, for instance,
computationally based services are already replacing the task of document
review that lawyers have performed in the past. But computational services
are on the cusp of substituting for other legal tasks—from the generation of
legal documents to predicting outcomes in litigation. And when machine
intelligence becomes as good as lawyers in developing some service or
some factor of production that contributes to a service, it does not stop
improving. Intelligent machines will become better and better, both in
terms of performance and cost. And unlike humans, they can work
ceaselessly around the clock, without sleep or caffeine. Such continuous
technological acceleration in computational power is the difference between
previous technological improvements in legal services and those driven by
machine intelligence. This difference makes it the single most important
* George C. Dixon Professor in Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of
Law.
** Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality, and Religion, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. See Jesse Holcomb, News Revenue Declines Despite Growth from New Sources,
PEW RES. CENTER (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/03/newsrevenue-declines-despite-growth-from-new-sources/.
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phenomenon with which the legal profession will need to grapple in the
coming decades.
These developments have enormous implications for every aspect of
law—legal practice, jurisprudence, and legal education. Here, we focus on
one important consequence: the weakening of lawyers’ market power over
providing legal services. We argue that these developments will generally
increase competition. They will commoditize legal services, permitting
clients to make easier price comparisons. They will also bring in new
entrants, both as direct suppliers of services and low-cost providers of
inputs to services of lawyers.
These new technologies will substantially shake up the legal profession,
harming the economic prospects of many lawyers, but providing advantages
to some others. Machines may actually aid two kinds of lawyers in
particular. First, superstars in the profession will be more identifiable and
will use technology to extend their reach. Second, lawyers who can change
their practice or organization to take advantage of lower cost inputs made
available by machines will be able to serve an expanding market of legal
services for middle-class individuals and small businesses, meeting
previously unfulfilled legal needs.
Machines may, at least at first, neither greatly help nor substantially harm
other classes of lawyers and some of their functions. First, because
machines will not speak in court for the foreseeable future, oral advocates
will continue to enjoy a lucrative niche, although machines may reduce the
number of disputes by creating a convergence of litigants on the value of a
case. Second, those lawyers who are in highly specialized areas subject to
rapid legal change, like Dodd-Frank regulation, will be relatively
unaffected, because machines will work best in more routinized and settled
areas. Third, counselors who must persuade unwilling clients to do what is
in their self-interest will also continue to have a role, since machines will be
unable to create the necessary emotional bonds with clients.
But journeymen lawyers—such as those who write routine wills, vet
house closings, write standard contracts, and review documents—face a
much bleaker future, because machines will do many such routine legal
tasks. Thus, while the arrival of the machines will be generally good for
consumers, the picture is much more mixed for lawyers.
The surest way for lawyers to retain the market power of old is to use bar
regulation to delay and obstruct the use of machine intelligence. But bar
regulation will generally be unavailing. First, lawyers will be able to use
many machine-created products to make their own work more cost
effective. Thus, using machine inputs can comply with bar regulation,
while also creating competitive pressures by lowering costs and reducing
the need for the aid of other lawyers. Second, even if unauthorized practice
laws in the United States do not change to permit extensive machine
intelligence in the production of legal services, those laws will continue to
prove ineffective in stemming the emergence of widespread machine
lawyering and preserving lawyers’ monopoly. Moreover, the global nature
of machine intelligence will continue to put pressure on the U.S. market for
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legal services, regardless of the laws of the United States. The message
here is that the machines are coming, and bar regulation will not keep them
out of the profession or do much to delay their arrival.
This Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the relentless growth
of computer power in hardware, software, and data collection capacity.
This Part emphasizes that machine intelligence is not a one-time event that
lawyers will have to accommodate. Instead, it is an accelerating force that
will invade an ever-larger territory and exercise a more firm dominion over
this larger area. We then describe five areas in which machine intelligence
will provide services or factors of production currently provided by
lawyers: discovery, legal search, document generation, brief generation,
and prediction of case outcomes. Part II discusses how these developments
may create unprecedented competitive pressures in many areas of
lawyering. This Part further shows that bar regulation will be unable to
stop such competition. Because bar regulation will be ineffective, we
expect an age of unparalleled innovation in legal services, as startups
compete to deliver important components of legal tasks in new ways.
I. THE MANY AVATARS OF MACHINE INTELLIGENCE IN LAW
In this Part, we first consider the general rise of machine intelligence.
Second, we consider how this rise may affect five areas of legal practice.
Third, we suggest that, over time, these transformations will change legal
practice, helping superstars at the expense of journeymen lawyers. Fourth,
we respond to some possible objections to the proposition that machine
intelligence will make a fundamental difference to the legal profession.
A. The Rise and Rise of Machine Intelligence
Computers have been accelerating in power according to “Moore’s Law.”
This law reflects the regularity that the number of transistors that can be
fitted onto a computer chip doubles every eighteen months2 to two years.3
For over forty years, computers have been growing at a similarly
exponential rate.4 Computers are to the late twentieth century and early
twenty-first century what the steam machine was to the nineteenth—the
primary dynamo and symbol of progress.5
Recently, researchers confirmed that Moore’s Law remains accurate and
further noted that a similar exponential growth occurs in the
telecommunication and storage of information.6 In a 2011 article, two
2. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1620 n.147 (2003).
3. See Moore’s Law, INTEL CORP., http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/siliconinnovations/moores-law-technology.html?wapkw=moores+law (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
4. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1620 n.147.
5. See HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 379–90 (Henry Cabot Lodge
ed., 1918) (discussing the Virgin as the symbol of the Middle Ages and the steam engine as
that of the nineteenth century).
6. See Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity To Store,
Communicate, and Compute Information, SCIENCE, Apr. 1, 2011, at 60, 64.
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researchers calculated that the computing capacity of information, which
they define as the communication of information through space and time
guided by an algorithm, is growing by approximately 58 percent a year—
very close to the eighteen-month doubling posited by Moore’s law.7 The
temporal communication aspect of information, such as broadband capacity,
has been growing at 28 percent per year, doubling in approximately thirtyfour months.8 The spatial capacity for storage has been growing at 23
percent per year with a doubling time of about forty months.9 The latter
capacities provide the infrastructure for the growth of “big data”—the
increasingly accurate representation of our world in digital form.
We generally think in linear terms. But when we understand its power,
exponential growth should command our attention. The computational
power in a cell phone today is a thousand times greater and a million times
less expensive than all the computing power housed at MIT in 1965.10
Assuming that computers continue to double in power, their hardware
dimension alone will be over two hundred times more powerful in 2030.11
To be sure, the question remains of how long Moore’s Law will continue.
Intel, the largest chipmaker, has projected that Moore’s Law will extend
until at least 2029.12 In any event, substantial evidence suggests that
computing has been growing at an exponential rate since before the rise of
the chips that power our machines today.13 Other methods are under study,
such as optical computing or quantum computing, which can provide
continued rapid growth.14
Looking at the exponential increase in hardware capability actually
understates the change in computational capacity in two ways. A study
considering improvements in a computer task used a benchmark for
measuring computer speed over a fifteen-year period.15 It suggested that
the speed of performing the task had been improved by 1,000 times through
increases in hardware capacity. But improvements in software algorithms
also increased computer speed to an even greater extent.16
Computers interconnect among themselves and with human intelligence.
The most salient and obvious mechanism is the internet. But this
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Ray Kurzweil, Making the World a Billion Times Better, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
2008, at B4.
11. See HANS MORAVEC, ROBOT: MERE MACHINE TO TRANSCENDENT MIND 7 (1999).
12. Jeremy Geelan, Moore’s Law: “We See No End in Sight,” Says Intel’s Pat
Gelsinger, SYS-CON MEDIA (May 1, 2008), http://java.sys-con.com/read/557154.htm.
13. Id.
14. For a helpful introduction to quantum computing, see GEORGE JOHNSON, A
SHORTCUT THROUGH TIME: THE PATH TO THE QUANTUM COMPUTER (2003).
15. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. &
TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: DESIGNING A DIGITAL FUTURE:
FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN NETWORKING AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 71 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/pcast-nitrd-report-2010.pdf.
16. Id.
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interconnection is a process, not a single event. The internet will not only
connect more and more people, but also more and more physical objects
though RFID tags—the so-called “internet of things.”17 The internet will
also become more sensate as more sensors are attached to it, connecting it
to the environment as well as the objects of the world around us.
The greater power of computation, as represented in hardware, software,
and connectivity, was behind the creation of Watson, the IBM machine that
beat the best Jeopardy champions of all time in 2011.18 Jeopardy is a game
of complexity and breadth, requiring players to disentangle elements that
seem unique to human understanding, including jokes, rhymes, and
language games. This combination of natural language capability, together
with the capacity to analyze issues containing different kinds of information
and ambiguity, make Watson’s application relevant to the discussion of
machines in the practice of law. Watson won by exploiting the
improvements in all three areas discussed above—hardware, software, and
connectivity—all capacities that can be expected to rapidly improve. As a
result, Watson is a harbinger of the growing scope of machine intelligence
in daily life.
Indeed, IBM considers Watson so important that it has created a division
around the machine, investing $1 billion in the machine’s development.19
IBM is using its program to aid in medical diagnosis.20 At a recent
competition on how to make use of Watson, the winning entry centered on
the legal field, using Watson to search for relevant evidence in data and
predict how helpful the evidence will be to winning the case.21 This kind of
intelligence will progressively transform legal practice, displacing many
tasks lawyers perform today. While we will look at many manifestations in
law, all machine-driven legal services will use sophisticated algorithms
both to structure data in various forms, such as legal documents, and to
make predictions about future events, like case outcomes.
Before looking at some of the current and forthcoming forms of machine
intelligence in the legal profession, it is important to recognize two central
propositions about the progress of machine intelligence. First, before the
combination of hardware, software, and connectivity progresses to a certain
point, machine intelligence represents no substitute for human activity. For
example, decades after computers were invented, they presented no

17. Michael Chui et al., The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY Q., Mar. 2010, at 70, 74.
18. See John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2011, at A1.
19. Quentin Hardy, IBM Is Betting That Watson Can Earn Its Keep, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2014, at B9.
20. Margalit Gur-Arie, IBM’s Watson Starts Its Medical Career, KEVINMD.COM (Mar.
30, 2013), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2013/03/ibms-watson-starts-medical-career.html;
see also Elementary Solution: IBM’s Watson To Sequence Cancer DNA, KHALEEJ TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2004), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?section=diversions
&xfile=/data/diversions/2014/March/diversions_March11.xml.
21. Mariella Moon, IBM Watson’s Supercomputer Has a New Job, As a Lawyer,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/watson-usccompetition/#!CqOoE.
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challenge to an average chess player, let alone grand masters. But once
machine intelligence reaches a level where it becomes competitive with
humans, it continues to improve, soon surpassing human skills. Second,
because increases in the power of computing are exponential rather than
linear, computers may be able to undertake complicated legal tasks
relatively sooner than it initially took computers to do simpler legal tasks.
For instance, in 2004, not a single autonomous vehicle drove farther than
eight miles on a course through the desert.22 But before the middle of the
next decade, researchers predict that driverless cars will transport
passengers in highway and urban driving.23 Similarly, in the past forty
years, legal computer programs have perfected only keyword searches.
However, because of technological acceleration, in less time computers will
be able to pick and choose for themselves the best precedent to cite in a
brief. Even if computational capacity doubles only every two years, the
next decade will witness more than thirty times as much increase in power
as the previous one. Thus, although machines are just beginning to perform
legal tasks, we can expect substantial progress in the decade ahead and
likely even more in the decades beyond.
B. Five Areas of Law on the Cusp of Machine Intelligence Invasion
In this section, we briefly describe five areas that machine intelligence
will dramatically change in the near future: (1) discovery; (2) legal search;
(3) document generation; (4) brief and memoranda generation; and
(5) prediction of case outcomes. Developments in predictive analytics,
which we will discuss at greatest length in connection with case outcomes,
will affect all five of these areas. But we have decided to use familiar
categories defined by legal tasks to describe the effects of machine
intelligence rather than focus more abstractly on computer methods. This
approach also allows us to highlight specific innovations and startups that
are early indications of the disruptions lawyers will face.
New information technology has already transformed some tasks, like
discovery. Others, like brief writing, have not yet been fundamentally
altered. But there are already signs that such fields will be transformed,
because information technology is already being developed in allied fields,
like journalism, to perform skills similar to those of lawyers. Because the
exponential growth in computation is relatively regular, it is possible to
estimate when various benchmarks may be reached. This section does not
provide a comprehensive depiction of developments in each of the five
areas; that kind of thick description would require five different articles.
But, sketching the arc of machine intelligence in disparate areas of legal
22. Marsha Walton, Robots Fail To Complete Grand Challenge: $1 Million Prize Goes
Unclaimed, CNN.COM (May 6, 2004, 10:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/
03/14/darpa.race/.
23. See Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles, Autonomous Parking, and Other
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems: Global Market Analysis and Forecasts, NAVIGANT
RES., http://www.navigantresearch.com/research/autonomous-vehicles (last visited Apr. 26,
2014).
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practice underscores our overall conclusion: machines are coming, and
once they become part of the legal practice, their performance will
exponentially improve.
1. Discovery
Machine intelligence is most advanced in discovery, probably because
legal discovery represents the application of general methods of machine
search to the review of legal documents. In its simpler, but still helpful,
form, electronic discovery, or e-discovery, is the process by which
computers search a database for keywords that lawyers agree are marks of
relevance.24 But keyword search is a relatively blunt instrument. Such
searches may be both over- and underinclusive because keywords may be
absent from some relevant documents and yet present in some irrelevant
documents.
Predictive coding has fundamentally transformed the prospects for ediscovery. In predictive coding, lawyers look at a sample of the larger set
of documents. Computer technicians help construct algorithms that predict
whether a document is relevant.25 Of course, predictive coding is
imperfect, because it can miss some documents. But, imperfection is the
norm even when lawyers perform document review, where fatigue,
boredom, and other frailties—which do not affect machines—can
substantially reduce the accuracy of document review. As a result, some
courts have approved predictive coding as a tool of discovery that
essentially will make the final decisions of relevance, because they believe
the price and performance of e-discovery is at least equal to that of the
traditional kind.26 The U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust division has
sometimes approved predictive coding for the review of antitrust cases
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.27 As
with other information technology, e-discovery will be more commonplace
as it becomes more accurate and less expensive.28
E-discovery is already changing the discovery practices of large
commercial litigation—which consumed much time of junior litigation
24. See Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, PRAC. LITIGATOR, May
2004, at 7, 9.
25. See Joseph H. Looby, E-Discovery—Taking Predictive Coding Out of the Black Box,
FTI J. (Nov. 2012), http://ftijournal.com/article/taking-predictive-coding-out-of-the-blackbox-deleted.
26. See, e.g., Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
27. Geoffrey Vance & Alison Silverstein, McDermott and DOJ Embrace Predictive
Coding; 5 Lessons Learned During Fast-Paced Merger Review, L. TECH. NEWS (July 9,
2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202609909310/McDermott-and-DOJEmbrace-Predictive-Coding?slreturn=20140305004807; see also Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
28. That is not to say that e-discovery will not raise important legal questions of its own,
particularly at the beginning of its adoption, such as how it will affect the proportionality
principle in discovery. For an excellent discussion of such questions, see Charles Yablon &
Nick Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 633 (2013).
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associates years ago. Now, large law firms have set up e-discovery units
within their firms. But new service providers independent of law firms are
also springing up. Modus, for instance, is an example of a corporation that
both digitizes records and helps with predictive algorithms.29 Thus,
lawyers will face competition from companies outside the profession that
want to offer discovery services to lawyers. These companies are likely
more innovative, specialized, and less attached to traditional ways of
thinking about the issue. The timeline for law firms to adopt e-discovery is
likely to be quite quick, with firms using some form of predictive coding in
essentially all large-scale litigation within the next decade.
2. Legal Search
Searching for the law by combing through precedents has been an
important part of legal work for centuries. Machine intelligence will not
only perform more of this work than lawyers, but will also perform it more
efficiently. Just as computers have progressively replaced humans in
complex calculations (people who made such calculations were in fact
called computers a hundred years ago), so will machine intelligence replace
the legal search function of lawyers.30
Computerized legal research began in the mid-1960s when the Ohio State
Bar Association tried to create an electronic system to sort through legal
opinions.31 That system became the foundation for the Lexis legal search
system, which was introduced to the public in 1974.32 Westlaw was offered
soon after, but its utility was limited, because it did not allow researchers to
search the full text of legal opinions.33 At the same time, the Lexis system
was handicapped because it contained an incomplete database of case law.34
These problems have largely been corrected, and both Westlaw and Lexis
are now staples of legal research.
Such research has already been an important element of legal practice,
replacing less efficient research from casebooks. And as hardware and
software capacity relentlessly improves, research is poised to become more
efficient in accurately finding the case law and evaluating it for
persuasiveness. Watson signals one improvement: the change from the use
of keywords to semantics. Previously, computerized legal search depended
on search for the right keywords. For example, a keyword search for

29. See generally MODUS, http://www.discovermodus.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
30. For a longer discussion of the history of legal search, see John O. McGinnis &
Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Series No. 12-22, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2130085.
31. F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has
Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 573 (2002).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. The LexisNexis Timeline, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/anniversary/30th_
timeline_fulltxt.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
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“bonds” did not necessarily bring up cases concerning debentures. That
limitation will disappear with the rise of semantic search.
Semantic search will allow lawyers to input natural language queries to
computers, and the computers will respond semantically to those queries
with directly relevant information. If one searches for assumption of risk,
the search may bring up cases that did not use these words but nevertheless
deployed the same concept.35 We are already beginning to see startups
bring more structure to the data comprised in a case, focusing on the
matters relevant to legal issues.36 This winnowing of data is a step toward
semantic search, because it makes cases conceptually tractable. Just as
Watson has effectively used pattern recognition to make use of concepts
rather than words, so will machine intelligence exploit deeper pattern
recognition to provide a kind of semantic search.37 LexisNexis is already
taking steps in this direction. But other search engines are starting to
compete in this space as well.38
All cases are not created equally in their precedential value: they are
more or less persuasive depending on the court and judge who decides the
case and the force that the precedent has acquired over time. They may also
have different weights depending on the kind of argument in which lawyers
use them and on the court and judge to whom the lawyer presents them.
Thus, even when lawyers find precedents by means of a computer, they rely
on their judgment when deploying it.
But machine intelligence will also make judgments about the strength of
precedent. Network analysis can now evaluate the strength of a precedent
by considering how much other cases rely on it.39 A recent start-up allows
searches of legal briefs, potentially connecting the briefs to the results of
cases in particular courts.40 Such services will also help gauge the strength
of legal precedent as it is tested in subsequent case law, both generally, and
also in the context of particular courts and judges. Machine intelligence
will not only uncover precedent but will also guide lawyers’ judgments

35. See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 30, at 32.
36. An example of such a startup is Judicata. JUDICATA, https://www.judicata.com/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014). It creates structured data from case law, thus allowing attorneys to
screen cases for specific procedural or factual details that make them more or less powerful
as precedents. See Lora Kolodny, Khosla Ventures, Peter Thiel Back Legal Research Startup
Judicata, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2013, 1:34 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/
2013/05/28/khosla-ventures-peter-thiel-back-legal-research-startup-judicata/.
37. For a discussion of progress in the semantics of legal search, see Johnathan Jenkins,
What Can Information Technology Do for Law?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 589, 597–604
(2008).
38. For instance, Ravel Law already offers free legal search. See generally RAVEL,
https://www.ravellaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
39. See James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 335 (2007).
40. BriefMine provides a database of legal briefs and opinions. The core idea is to use
search algorithms to relate the legal briefs to the relevant opinion. Through such
connections, BriefMine hopes to help lawyers understand how the winning brief contributed
to victory in the subsequent opinion. See generally BRIEFMINE, http://briefmine.com/about
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
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about the use of precedent, as most lawyers can neither comprehensively
evaluate the strength of precedent or recall all possible precedents to mind.
As powerful as a semantic search that gauges precedential power will be,
this kind of search is only the first phase of the improvement of legal
search.41 In this first phase, the search engine will identify the relevant
cases and then evaluate their optimal use. Still, in this phase, the lawyer
will do all the issue spotting and use the search engine only to identify the
relevant cases. In the second phase, the search engine itself will identify the
issues implicated within a given set of facts and then suggest the case law
likely to be on point for the issues it identified. This second phase will
further reduce the role of the lawyer in legal research.
The speed of this change will depend on general improvements in search
technology because that market is so much larger than the market for legal
search. We expect that the first phase of perfecting semantic search,
including the evaluation of the strengths and uses of precedent, will come in
the next ten to fifteen years.
3. Documents As Forms
Legal forms are hardly new. Since the middle ages when lawyers used
forms of action, templates helped reduce the cost of law. But machine
intelligence will revolutionize the use of legal forms. Most obviously,
machine intelligence will help tailor these forms to meet individual
situations. For instance, a client of LegalZoom can already submit
information about his assets and his intentions for disposal of his estate to
generate a draft of a will.42 Trust and estate planning is already ripe for this
kind of mechanization because this area of law has relatively few kinds of
forms and unique factual situations that arise for the large majority of
people.
But as computers and software become more powerful, computergenerated forms will have an even wider scope in legal practice. Already,
new companies, like Kiiac, attempt to use machine intelligence to generate
a wider variety of documents.43
In the future, documents will also improve as they become more closely
connected to results. With the growing interconnectedness of data,
machines can relate specific contracts to all court decisions about them,
creating a dynamic of practical critique for continual improvement of legal
forms.
41. See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 30, at 33 (discussing the first and second phase
of legal search).
42. Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy,
53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 918 n.159 (2012).
43. See generally KIIAC, http://www.kiiac.com/index.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
Kiiac is not the only company in this space. LawDepot is a website that can create
customized legal documents. See generally LAWDEPOT, http://www.lawdepot.com/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014). Hotdocs is a software platform that automates the process of
producing transactional legal documents and forms. See generally HOTDOCS,
http://www.hotdocs.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
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Of course, at first, lawyers will still be very involved in marking up the
first drafts that machines create. But even at this stage, the savings can be
very large. For instance, Fenwick & West, a firm whose principal office is
in Silicon Valley, developed a program that automatically creates the
documents for incorporating startups.44 Matt Kesner, their technology
officer, said: “‘It reduced the average time we were spending from about
20 to 40 hours of billable time down to a handful of hours . . . . In cases
with even extensive documents, we can cut the time of document creation
from days and weeks to hours.’”45
In the future, machine processing will be able to automate a form, tailor it
according to the specific facts and legal arguments, and track its effect in
future litigation. As hardware and software capacity improves, so too will
the generated documents. We predict that within ten to fifteen years,
computer-based services will routinely generate the first draft of most
transactional documents.
4. Documents As Briefs and Memos
Machine intelligence will not stop with automating forms. Legal forms
are easier to automate than legal memos or briefs because they often depend
on more formulaic inputs. At first these documents will serve as very rough
drafts and will require very substantial additions and rewriting.
Nevertheless, computer-generated drafts can still be valuable and
comparable to the efforts of associates—even research assistants without
law degrees—who generate drafts that an experienced associate can then
shape into a far more polished product. And, as with other advances in
machine intelligence, programs become more useful over time. That
progression is evident in other technology, such as word processing and
speech-to-text programs.
Analogous programs already encroach on traditional journalism. Just
this year, the Los Angeles Times used a computer to write a story of
breaking news about an earthquake.46 Its so-called Quakebot connected to
information from the U.S. Geological Survey and created a publishable
story from the data.47 The technology startup Narrative Science has similar
programs that can write simple stories about business and sports.48 While
these programs are simple now, more powerful computers and more
advanced algorithms will produce a more sophisticated program.

44. Farhad Manjoo, Will Robots Steal Your Job?: Software Could Kill Lawyers. Why
That’s Good for Everyone Else, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/robot_invasion/2011/09/will_robots_steal_your_job_5.html.
45. Id.
46. Catherine Taibi, It’s All Over: Computers Are Now Writing Stories, and Doing a
Good Job, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/
la-times-robot-journalism-earthquake_n_4985929.html.
47. Id.
48. See Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Being Wrote This Column,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011, at BU3.
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Ultimately, these kinds of programs will be able to provide drafts of
briefs and memos, as well as connect to legal research programs, which will
provide data for the writing program. As with legal search, we expect
substantial progress in programs over the next fifteen years until they
deliver very useful drafts. In the decade or two after that, such programs
may deliver more finished products, at least for low-value transactions.
5. Legal Analytics
Predictive analytics is a new discipline that combines data with analysis
to make predictions. Computational power allows substantial data to be
collected and organized. Patterns can then be found among the data.49
Machine learning can help analyze regularities within the patterns. With
the help of these models, known data can be used to predict what will
happen in situations that have not yet occurred.50 The missing data may be
unknown and indeed unknowable if the data consists of future events, like
the outcome of a legal case. Predictive analytics is all the rage across the
corporate world.51
Using big data to guide decisions is one of the most important trends of
the last decade.52 It has intensified so much that universities now offer
courses, and indeed degrees, in data analytics.
Predictive analytics is now coming to law.53 Indeed, law, with its
massive amounts of data from case law, briefs, and other documents, is
conducive to machine data mining that is the foundation of this new
predictive science. Legal data include fact patterns, precedents, and case
outcomes. For instance, one form of legal analytics would use fact patterns
and precedent to predict a case’s outcome, thereby better equipping lawyers
to assess the likely result of litigation.
Of course, lawyers make implicit judgments about litigation prospects
when advising clients whether to bring a lawsuit, settle, or go to trial. But
their advice is based on their intuitions and limited to their direct or indirect
experience of law. The advantage of predictive analytics is that it provides
a mechanism both to access a vast amount of information and
systematically mine that information to understand the likely outcome of
the case at hand.
Legal analytics is not a distant prospect; already, academics and
companies are putting it into action. For example, political scientists

49. See ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL
CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 15 (2013).
50. See id.
51. See Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1 (suggesting
that corporate America now needs a million and half new data-literate employees to work in
the area).
52. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6–12 (2013).
53. The best full-scale analysis in the legal literature is Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative
Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the DataDriven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013).
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created a model of U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking, based on previous
Court decisions, that more accurately predicted future outcomes than a set
of Supreme Court experts.54 A new company, Lex Machina, has gathered
historical data from thousands of instances of patent litigation55 and is
already being used to predict outcomes in that field.56 Lex Machina
provides consulting services itself and also sells data to those who want to
do their own modeling.57
Admittedly, patent law is a relatively self-contained area of law. Further,
Supreme Court decisions regarding patent law, while touching on many
issues, revolve around the votes of only nine justices. Thus, patent law and
the relevant Supreme Court decisions are perhaps the relatively easy legal
concentrations for analytics to model. Patent law also involves more highvalue cases than many other areas of law and, thus, it is more lucrative to
use predictive analytics in patent litigation than in other practice areas. But
given the exponential improvement in the price performance of computers,
the same approach will be taken to other areas of law within a decade.
Predictive analytics will be imperfect, providing likelihoods rather than
certainties. But predictive analytics can still displace some lawyers by
making better predictions than they do.
To be sure, legal analytics will still leave a role for lawyers. A lawyer’s
judgment may still add some value to the predictions derived from machine
intelligence, even if the machine prediction alone is better than the lawyer’s
prediction alone. Over time, however, legal analytics will reduce the value
of a lawyer’s assessment in at least some cases.
The rise of legal analytics will also have an effect on the number of cases
that go to trial and the amount of discovery. Whenever the parties agree on
the amount a case is worth, the case is likely to settle.58 The convergence
does not need to be perfect for two reasons. First, the expense of legal fees
on both sides creates a larger window in which settlement is sensible,
because both sides will be better off settling for an amount between their
estimates of the case’s value to save legal fees. Second, in many cases, at
least one side is risk averse and would prefer the certainty of settlement to
the risks of litigation.59 As legal analytics provide better estimates of a
case’s value, parties will converge more rapidly toward an agreement that
falls within the settlement window created by legal fees and risk aversion.

54. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1150 (2004).
55. See Tam Harbert, Lex Machina Arms Corporate Leaders and Patent Attorneys with
Predictive Analytics, DATAINFORMED (June 6, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://data-informed.com/
lex-machina-arms-corporate-leaders-and-patent-attorneys-with-predictive-analytics/.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Robert A. Weninger, Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Trapping the
Unwary, 26 REV. LITIG. 401, 412 n.25 (2007).
59. Dana A. Kerr, The Effect of Ownership Structure on Insurance Company Litigation
Strategy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 276 (2005).
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6. Future Trends
The areas of legal practice on the cusp of change through legal search—
discovery, search, document generation of both forms and briefs, and
predictions of case outcomes—comprise the bulk of tasks in many legal
practices. As a result, those who engage in the routine elements of such
services will face increasing competition from machines.
Moreover, as machine intelligence commoditizes many aspects of law,
information technology will accelerate greater transparency that will, in
turn, accelerate such lawyers’ loss of market power over legal services.
Most obviously, the transparency will come in the form of consumers’
increased ability to compare the prices of legal services. But new services
will also arise to help consumers compare the quality of lawyers. Startups
are presently devising metrics that use available data to compare the
performance of lawyers.60
But even if average lawyers will be disadvantaged, some superstars may
earn even greater returns. First, with great metrics of comparison,
discerning who the superstars are will be easier.61 Second, superstars can
extend their research through technology: they deliver their innovative
solutions to problems faster and to a broader range of clients.62 Some of
these innovations will be in traditional lawyering, such as creating new
forms of familiar transactions and shaping surprising and novel arguments.
Partners may also be able to substitute machines for associates, thereby
gaining more leverage at lower cost. Third, for a range of important
transactions and litigation, even small improvements in outcomes make it
worthwhile for clients to pay for noncommoditized legal services. Even if
the machine intelligence provides very good services, mixing in human
intelligence may assure the best possible result. Accordingly, we may see
an even more bimodal distribution of legal salaries, perhaps with a smaller
group of even more highly compensated lawyers.
Machine intelligence may also help lawyers, through skill or better
organization, increase delivery of very low-priced services. Unmet legal
needs exist across the nation, generally for low- and middle-income people
who cannot afford the prices lawyers charge. These legal needs include
matters as varied as counseling on small-business matters and writing
prenuptial agreements. Lawyers can use machines to help generate relevant
forms, thereby reducing the costs of providing services and making the
services more broadly affordable.
Machines may affect some other areas of law to a lesser extent, because
machines cannot easily add as much value to certain tasks lawyers perform.

60. An example is Avvo. AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
61. We already see this phenomenon in judicial opinions. Because opinions are readily
accessible now, small differences in quality lead to large differences in citation rates. See
William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 275 (1998).
62. See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 857
(1981).
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For instance, machines will not argue in court and thus will not replace
those who specialize in oral advocacy. Nevertheless, machines will
indirectly affect the practice of trial and appellate lawyers. With more
accurate predictions of case outcomes, fewer trials should occur because
more parties will settle. And even trial practice requires research,
discovery, and production of documents—all tasks that machine
intelligence will radically alter.
Lawyers are more likely to excel if they are specialists in novel laws and
regulations.63 Machines will generally be most effective at finding patterns
in past data to predict the future. But if the current time is radically
disconnected from the past or involves small amounts of specialized
information, machines will have less data to analyze. Consider, for
example, hypothetical banking legislation, equivalent in scope and novelty
to the Dodd-Frank legislation of 2010,64 passed ten years hence. As they
lobby for and interpret new regulations in the early years of the new legal
regime, lawyers working on that legislation will add a lot of value for their
clients. Given the world’s ongoing technological acceleration, lawyers who
specialize in areas connected to that acceleration, like intellectual property,
may also continue to prosper.
Lawyers do more than undertake legal analysis. They bond with their
clients, thereby fostering relationships of trust, which allow the lawyer to
facilitate clients to see their long-term legal self-interest, even when clients’
passions and confusions cloud that interest.65 Machines are unlikely to
perform this bonding function and, thus, will be unlikely to substantially
affect this important aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.
The overall effect of the machine invasion thus will be quite mixed for
lawyers, but particularly difficult for nonspecialized lawyers of average or
worse than average ability. For consumers at every level, the progress of
machine intelligence is excellent news, offering lower prices and more
transparency. It is especially good for the underserved middle class and
even the poor who are more likely to access legal services at prices they can
afford.

63. Cf. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm
Culture and Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 119
(2013).
64. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, and 42
U.S.C.).
65. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1103, 1139–40 (1992) (“The bond between lawyer and client fuels, and is fueled by,
the heart of client-centered counseling—the careful, even elaborate, process in which lawyer
and client work together to identify the relevant considerations on which the decision should
be based. This process makes sense only if it is believed that people are prone to overlook
or misjudge important issues bearing on their decisions, and that correcting such errors is an
essential predicate to their making decisions that truly serve their own interests.” (citations
omitted)).
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7. Answers to Common Objections
One common objection is that lawyers have always adapted to
technological change and, in doing so, even increased their incomes:
typewriters replaced quill pens, word processors replaced typewriters, and
carbon paper came and went. Lawyers continued to prosper and grow in
numbers. What is the distinction for the legal profession between the
technological changes of the past and those of the future?
The key differences are two. First, the technology is now beginning to
substitute for core legal skills, unlike copying and transcription. The
physical acts of writing and copying were not core legal skills. Indeed,
lawyers generally depended on copyists or secretaries to complete these
tasks. But now machines are climbing the value-added ladder, encroaching
on the domain of lawyers. Second, the rate at which machines are
improving, and thus substituting for lawyers, is faster than ever before.
Another objection is that these changes will create litigation about their
proper scope, thus creating more, not less, demand for legal services. We
address below the question of bar regulation. But there will also be debate
about how to integrate such changes into the legal order. For instance, ediscovery has prompted new questions and will continue to do so. These
are merely transition costs, since the issues about e-discovery will
ultimately be relatively settled. And the savings from e-discovery—the
huge amount of lawyer time required for litigation document review—will
expand as the practice expands and deepens with computational advances.
The larger point is that technological change, including change in legal
technology, does impose transition costs, but transition is short term and the
savings gains will be cumulative and increasing in the long term.
A third objection is that these machines can never replace lawyers’
judgment. First of all, not all tasks that modern lawyers undertake require
much judgment. Drawing up simple wills, for instance, is fairly routine.
Also, machines can make judgments. Watson displayed his confidence
levels in different possible answers at Jeopardy, and this technology will
soon be employed in medical diagnostics.66 It is difficult to argue that such
a program is not exercising some of the same judgment required for legal
tasks. We agree that many tasks will still require lawyers’ judgment, but
judgment will be required in fewer areas. Even in those areas, lawyers will
exercise judgment with the aid of substantial machine intelligence.
Finally, some have argued that the promise of big data, which is a
foundation of predictive analysis, is overstated.67 For instance, it is said
that big data can show only correlation but not causation.68 Thus, in one of
our examples, it might be objected that even if we show that a judge cited
66. See Adrienne Jane Burke, How IBM’s Watson Will Advise Oncologists on Patient
Care, TECHONOMY (Mar. 20, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://techonomy.com/2014/03/ibms-watsonwill-advise-oncologists/.
67. Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems with Big Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2014, at A23.
68. Id.
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certain kinds of cases, it would not show that these cases were what
prompted his decision. But this correlation might well prompt investigation
that would tell us things that would help a lawyer persuade the judge. And
even if the judge’s decisionmaking remains a black box, it seems that a
lawyer would be well advised to rely on the kind of cases that showed up in
the judge’s decisions, other things being equal. It is also said that data
works less well on small samples.69 We agree, and this is one reason why
we think the future is brighter for lawyers in fast-changing, specialized
areas of law. But in other better-settled areas of law, there is a very large
amount of relevant data. More generally, we agree that big data is currently
an imperfect tool, but like many other sophisticated, imperfect tools, it can
substitute for substantial amounts of human labor, and some of the labor
will be that of lawyers.
II. REGULATORY BARRIERS WILL NOT PREVENT MACHINE INTELLIGENCE
FROM UNDERMINING LAWYERS’ MONOPOLY
Part II builds on the foundation described in Part I: machine intelligence
will play an increasing role in the legal services market to the extent that it
provides quality, lower cost legal services, or inputs into lawyers’ services.
Except for superstars, highly specialized practices in areas subject to rapid
legal change, and in-court appearances, machine intelligence already
provides lawyers with significant competition, and this competition is only
likely to increase. The legal profession has, for the most part, accepted
machine intelligence as an input and has even modified its rules to
accommodate this development.70 At the same time, the legal profession
has continued to promote unauthorized practice of law statutes that, on their
face, create barriers to machine intelligence providing legal services or
input to nonlawyers offering legal services.71 Nonetheless, despite
unauthorized practice laws, the legal services market has largely become de
facto deregulated with regard to machine intelligence, as Benjamin Barton
and other commentators have noted.72 But even increased unauthorized
practice enforcement in the United States would likely fail to stem the
delivery of legal services through machine intelligence given the way the
internet permits legal services providers throughout the world to deliver to
U.S. consumers.73
A. The Significant Market Power of Machine Intelligence
Machine intelligence has already begun to significantly compete with
lawyers and undermine their monopoly. Today, sizeable financial
industries use machine intelligence to deliver legal services, even though

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 116–26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
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the most economically significant developments have occurred in only three
of the five areas we identify in Part I.
The three areas that have proven most profitable are legal research,
discovery, and document generation. First, the oldest and most lucrative
area is legal research. As we noted in Part I, the application of machine
intelligence to legal research began in the mid-1960s and for-profit
businesses, such as Lexis and Westlaw, entered the field in the 1970s.74
Bloomberg LLP joined the competition in 2010.75 As of that time, the legal
search industry had “generate[d] $8 billion a year in revenue.”76 Second,
the application of machine intelligence to discovery resulted in global
market revenue of $3.6 billion in 2010 ($1.1 billion in software and $2.5
billion in services), with growth to $9.9 billion anticipated by 2017 ($2.5
billion in software and $7.4 billion in services).77
Third, document generation, while less established, is growing
dramatically. LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer, Nolo, and Law Depot, among
others, offer online consumer and small-business services using machine
intelligence. Major financial players have entered the market with Permira
and Kleiner Perkins owning an interest in LegalZoom78 and Rocket Lawyer
raising funds from Google Ventures.79 In 2011, for example, Rocket
Lawyer had “70,000 users a day and has doubled revenue for four years
straight to more than $10 million.”80 LegalZoom appears to be the industry
leader with 2 million customers in its first ten years through 2011, and half
a million in 2011 alone.81 Its revenue has grown from “$103 million in
2009, $120 million in 2010, $156 million in 2011, rising to almost $47
million in the first three months of 2012,”82 an annual rate of $188 million.
In 2011 alone, “more than 20 percent of new California limited liability
companies were formed using [LegalZoom].”83 Another large market is
contract management, an industry that uses software to “automate[] the
creation, tracking and monitoring of contracts and agreements” for business

74. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
75. See Russell Adams, Bloomberg Hangs Shingle: Financial-Data Firm Enters Legal
Research, Challenging Westlaw, LexisNexis, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2010, at B8.
76. Id.
77. The E-Discovery Market Is Growing Fast, EDISCOVERY BUS. (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://ediscoverybusiness.com/the-e-discovery-market-is-growing-fast/.
78. Viola Caon, Permira Funds To Acquire $200m of LegalZoom Equity, INVESTMENT
EUR. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.investmenteurope.net/investment-europe/news/2321352/
permira-funds-to-acquire-usd200m-of-legalzoom-equity.
79. Daniel Fisher, Google Jumps into Online-Law Business with Rocket Lawyer, FORBES
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/08/11/google-jumps-intoonline-law-business-with-rocket-lawyer/.
80. Id.
81. Benjamin H. Barton, A Glass Half Full Look at the Changes in the American Legal
Market 17 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 210, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2054857.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 17 (quoting LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 3
to Form S-1) (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1286139/000104746912007341/a2209713zs-1a.htm).
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clients, including multinational corporations.84 A $400 million industry as
of 2013, experts anticipated annual growth of 10 to 20 percent.85
Accordingly, in these three areas alone, machine intelligence has made
significant progress in undermining lawyers’ monopoly.
Machine
intelligence already accounts for billions of dollars of legal services, and we
can expect continued, exponential increases in the ability of machine
intelligence to provide quality services at lower prices than human lawyers
in these areas, as well as in the emerging areas of generating legal
memoranda and predicting case outcomes.86
The only potential
impediments to the rapid growth of machine intelligence in lawyering are
legal barriers.
B. Why Legal Barriers Will Not Obstruct the Increasing Use of Machine
Intelligence To Provide Legal Services
Some commentators, including Larry Ribstein,87 William Henderson,88
Ray Campbell,89 and Gillian Hadfield,90 have suggested that legal obstacles
will hinder the application of machine intelligence to legal services. While
we agree with commentators’ skepticism of the unauthorized practice
statutes and concede that those statutes pose some limited risk to the
expansion of machine intelligence, we believe they will ultimately fail to
stop the progress of machine intelligence in legal services. First, the ethics
rules do not prohibit lawyers from employing machine intelligence to
perform work previously or potentially done by lawyers. Second, even
though unauthorized practice laws formally prohibit businesses that include
nonlawyer investors or managers from providing legal services,91 the
unauthorized practice laws have not been applied successfully to police
machine intelligence products.92
1. Input into Lawyers’ Work
The legal profession has accepted, and even embraced, machine
intelligence as an input. To facilitate this development, the American Bar
Association (ABA) clarified its rules to permit and, in some instances,

84. Capterra Names Top 20 Companies in Contract Management Software Industry,
PRWEB (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/10/prweb11204284.htm.
85. Id.
86. See supra Part I.B.4–5.
87. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 807–08.
88. William Henderson, Are We Asking the Wrong Questions About Lawyer
Regulation?, TRUTH ON MARKET (Sept. 19, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/09/19/
william-henderson-on-are-we-asking-the-wrong-questions-about-lawyer-regulation/.
89. Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal
Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 45–51 (2012).
90. Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of
Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1720–21,
1724–25 (2008).
91. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 116–23 and accompanying text.
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require the use of machine intelligence.93 In doing so, the ABA has
categorized machine intelligence as either an inanimate tool, much like a
computer, or as a nonlawyer assistant. To the extent that machine
intelligence is an input, lawyers must use it if necessary to provide
competent services and should use it if it will help offer excellent services.
An inanimate tool poses no threat under the rules, and nonlawyer assistance
is acceptable so long as lawyers do not share fees with the nonlawyers and
are unable to interfere with lawyers’ professional judgment.94
In
purchasing and deploying machine intelligence as an input, even from an
outside consultant, lawyers do not share fees and do not surrender their
control of the delivery of legal services.
The ABA has emphasized the importance of machine intelligence to the
competence of lawyers. Despite the fears of some that lawyers generally
“lack . . . technological competence,”95 the ABA embraced machine
intelligence inputs in new language added in 2012 to Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.1 as Comment 8. This comment posits that “[t]o
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill [necessary to provide competent
representation], a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant
technology.”96 Mastery of technology relevant to providing legal services,
including machine intelligence, has therefore become an express duty of a
competent lawyer, as well as an essential obligation of the exemplary
lawyer.
At the same time, the ABA resolved issues regarding whether lawyers
could lawfully employ nonlawyer-owned firms that provide machine
intelligence services and whether such a machine intelligence input was
consistent with the general approach that lawyers could employ or retain
nonlawyers, so long as the lawyers controlled and supervised their input.97
Some commentators objected that the use of machine intelligence services
was in a different category than supervising paralegals in that “lawyers lack
the requisite knowledge to supervise such a vendor.”98 Dana Remus, for
example, has argued that lawyers generally do not possess “the proper
analytical tools to assess whether a particular technology is adequate for the
93. See infra notes 95–105 and accompanying text.
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3–.4 (2013).
95. Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21), available at http://works.bepress.com/dana_
remus/1/.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8; see Darla W. Jackson, Lawyers
Can’t Be Luddites Anymore: Do Law Librarians Have a Role in Helping Lawyers Adjust to
the New Ethics Rules Involving Technology?, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 395, 396 (2013).
97. See, e.g., Remus, supra note 95 (manuscript at 20) (describing bar ethics opinions
that permit the “delegation of document review to off-shore document processing firms,
where legal work is supervised but not performed by lawyers licensed within United States
jurisdictions. The American Bar Association (ABA) and several state commissions have
issued formal opinions concluding that outsourcing to these firms does not constitute
unauthorized legal practice as long as licensed U.S. attorneys retain strict supervisory
roles”).
98. Id. (manuscript at 21).
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task, or whether it is working properly when employed, raising questions
about the scope of lawyer supervision.”99
Rejecting such concerns, the ABA in 2012 amended the Model Rules in
ways that facilitate lawyers’ use of machine intelligence.100 New language
in the comment to Rule 5.3, which governs lawyers’ “Responsibilities
Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance,” specifically acknowledges that “lawyers
may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal
services to the client.”101 The comment expressly states that nonlawyer
assistance can include firms that rely on machine intelligence, such as ediscovery consultants, and offers as specific “[e]xamples . . . hiring a
document management company to create and maintain a database for
complex litigation, . . . and using an Internet-based service to store client
information.”102 Lawyers can ethically use these services so long as the
lawyer “make[s] reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are provided
in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional
obligations.”103 Moreover, in language that encourages lawyers to use
outside providers of machine intelligence services even when the client
chooses the services provider, the comment states that the lawyer can share
responsibility for monitoring the outside firm. By permitting lawyers to
“share responsibility,” this comment gives lawyers more leeway than the
general rule that a lawyer is fully responsible for supervising nonlawyer
assistants and vendors.104 The comment specifically states that “[w]here
the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider
outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client
concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the
client and the lawyer.”105
2. Input into Nonlawyer Delivery of Legal Services
When nonlawyers who are not working for lawyers provide legal
services using machine intelligence, they infringe state laws that prohibit
the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers. Under these laws,
nonlawyers may only act as scriveners in filling out forms or publish legal
forms with blanks for consumers to complete or books that provide general
guidance to the public.106 As a general matter, unauthorized practice laws
prohibit nonlawyers from providing personalized legal assistance.107
Nonlawyers violate the letter of unauthorized practice laws when they sell
99. Id.
100. Jackson, supra note 96, at 395.
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 cmt. 3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. R. 5.3. As one critic has noted, “Through these new provisions, the ABA
abdicates a portion of the profession’s supervisory responsibilities over discovery practice to
clients and other professionals.” Remus, supra note 95 (manuscript at 21).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 cmt. 4.
106. See Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An
Overview of Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2581 (1999).
107. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978).
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software or other machine intelligence that provides personalized legal
assistance. This is true regardless of whether the program provides
individually tailored answers to legal questions or personalized documents,
such as wills, contracts, or articles of incorporation.108 Typically, in such
programs, the machine intelligence engages in a dialogue with the
consumer where the machine asks a series of questions and, depending
upon the consumer response, asks further questions or generates legal
language.109 At the end of the process, the machine intelligence generates a
legal document tailored to the specific consumer.110 When nonlawyers, or
businesses with nonlawyer owners or investors, employ machine
intelligence in this way, they have engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.111
For example, in the leading case of Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc.,112 the Texas Unauthorized Practice
of Law Committee sued to enjoin Parsons Technology from selling
Quicken Family Lawyer (QFL), a software program that helped consumers
create a variety of legal documents, including wills, trusts, and residential
landlord-tenant leases.113 The court explained:
When the user accesses a document, QFL asks a series of questions
relevant to filling in the legal form. With certain questions, a separate text
box explaining the relevant legal considerations the user may want to take
into account in filling out the form also appears on the screen. As the user
proceeds through the questions relevant to the specific form, QFL either
fills in the appropriate blanks or adds or deletes entire clauses from the
form. For example, in the “Real Estate Lease—Residential” form,
depending on how the user answers the question regarding subleasing the
apartment, a clause permitting subleasing with the consent of the landlord
is either included or excluded from the form. 114

Applying the rule that individually tailored services constituted
unauthorized practice of law, the court found that QFL violated the Texas
prohibition on unauthorized practice of law and granted an injunction to the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee.115
Although these laws technically create an obstacle to machine
intelligence providing legal services, in practice, the market for these
services has become de facto deregulated.116 Even William Henderson,

108. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document
Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 821 (2002).
109. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
112. No. Civ.A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated and
remanded per curiam, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
113. See id. at *1.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at *7, *10.
116. Benjamin H. Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3067, 3068 (2014). As Barton—and this paragraph—explain, Ray
Campbell mistakenly limits de facto deregulation to legal services for corporate clients.
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who worries that unauthorized practice of law inhibits innovation, has
observed that “[i]n ten years, much of the deregulation agenda will come to
pass without any formal deregulation. U.S. consumers and businesses are
already voting with their feet.”117 Apparently, while the public has not yet
challenged lawyers’ monopoly on providing human legal services, it feels
entitled to have the freedom to purchase legal services provided by software
and other forms of machine intelligence. Indeed, within a short period of
time after the district court decision in Parsons Technology, the Texas
legislature expressly permitted the sale of computer software, such as QFL,
as well as “‘similar products’” that provided individualized legal
services.118 Similar lawsuits in Missouri119 and Washington against
LegalZoom have created only “bumps in the road”120 that have resulted in
“little change in [the] business.”121 As Benjamin Barton has noted,
LegalZoom “has simply ignored the threat of [the unauthorized practice of
law], getting bigger and more prevalent all the time. This is actually its
most powerful tool. The larger, older, and more common LegalZoom gets,
the less likely a court will find [unauthorized practice of law] and the more
likely that a legislature might attempt to overrule an adverse decision.”122
Indeed, the only significant opposition to nonlawyer providers of legal
services has been to human assistance combined with machine intelligence,
and not to machine intelligence alone.123 The combined human and
computer assistance is the only area where LegalZoom has been forced to
significantly alter its business plan.
Moreover, even in the unlikely event that state regulators were to seek
successfully to outlaw U.S. businesses from providing machine intelligence
delivery of legal services, they would not be able to prevent the delivery of
such services in the United States. As Laurel Terry has noted, the legal
services world is now flat.124 On the internet, providers based in other
countries could readily provide U.S. residents with machine intelligence
services providing legal assistance or advice under relevant U.S. law.
These providers could be based in the United Kingdom, which now permits

117. Henderson, supra note 88.
118. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting H.B. 1507, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.1999)).
119. Nathan Koppel, Seller of Online Legal Forms Settles Unauthorized Practice of Law
Suit, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/23/seller-ofonline-legal-forms-settles-unauthorized-practiced-of-law-suit/.
120. Barton, supra note 81, at 16.
121. Id. at 15 (quoting Daniel Fisher, Silicon Valley Sees Gold in Internet Legal Services,
FORBES (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/10/05/silicon-valleysees-gold-in-internet-legal-services/) (alteration in original).
122. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: AMERICA’S LAWYER CRISIS AND ITS
UPSIDE 135 (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 135) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
123. Campbell, supra note 89, at 46 (describing the contribution of unauthorized practice
of law suits to bankruptcy of We the People, a business that sold “legal forms to consumers
from franchised storefront offices”); Henderson, supra note 88.
124. See generally Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat: Globalization and Its Effect
on Lawyers Practicing in Non-global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527 (2008).
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nonlawyer providers of legal services,125 or in other legally sophisticated
countries, such as China or India.
Accordingly, those commentators, such as Hadfield, Henderson, and
Ribstein, who argue that the unauthorized practice laws will seriously
inhibit innovation in machine intelligence delivery of legal services, are not
correct.126 Although unauthorized practice of law statutes undoubtedly
inhibit innovation to some degree, they present only a manageable
obstruction. The de facto legalization of machine intelligence when offered
without human assistance will only provide a greater incentive to
developing more sophisticated and profitable machine intelligence services.
III. WHY OPPOSITION TO MACHINE INTELLIGENCE DELIVERY
OF LEGAL SERVICES PERSISTS
As we explained in Part I, the exponential development of machine
intelligence in legal services is inevitable, and the application of machine
intelligence to legal services will result in better quality legal services at a
lower cost. In Part II, we explained how regulatory barriers will not prevent
this advance. Given that machine intelligence is inevitable and will only
improve the delivery of legal services and increase access to justice, why
does opposition to machine intelligence in legal services persist? We
suggest that this opposition derives from two sources: first, fear of machine
intelligence and second, fear of the implications for lawyers’ monopoly.
The fear of machine intelligence takes two forms. One commentator
argues that machine intelligence will never be able to provide legal services
competently.127 We know from the success of machine intelligence in other
fields that this fear is demonstrably false. Over time, machine intelligence
will inevitably outperform human lawyers in completing most legal
services.128 Another commentator worries that lawyers will not be
competent to evaluate machine intelligence.129 But as in other areas of
technological advance, human legal experts will continue to assess the
outputs of machine intelligence, even if as individuals they are unable to
understand fully how that machine intelligence works. Moreover, until the
advent of true artificial intelligence, some human experts will retain the
ability to program and assess the programming of machine intelligence in
delivering legal services.
Absent justification, the fear of machine intelligence in lawyering
appears more likely connected to the commitment to preserving lawyers’
monopoly. Machine intelligence not only threatens lawyers’ monopoly in
practice, it also challenges the two elements that are necessary to justify

125. See generally John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions
for the Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537.
126. See supra notes 87–90.
127. Campbell, supra note 89, at 12 (“At a fundamental level, the form legal document is
inferior to the services of a competent attorney.”).
128. See supra Part I.A, I.B.6–7.
129. Remus, supra note 95 (manuscript at 21–22).
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lawyers’ monopoly.130 The first element is the belief that legal expertise is
inaccessible to nonlawyers. The second element is the belief that lawyers,
in contrast to business people, work to serve the public good. Accordingly,
even though the public does not have expertise necessary to regulate legal
services, it can trust lawyers to regulate themselves in the public interest
and need not fear that lawyers’ monopoly will result in rent seeking.131
But if machine intelligence can provide services as expert as those
lawyers could offer, or could provide nonlawyers with access to legal
expertise, then the first ground for protecting lawyers’ monopoly—
inaccessible expertise—fails.
The other primary justification for
professional privilege is lawyers’ commitment to, and protection of, the
public good. The delivery of legal services by machine intelligence
suggests that legal services are a commodity. The commodification of legal
services highlights the reality that legal services, and therefore access to
justice, are bought and sold. As with other commodities, more money can
buy better quality. And better quality legal services translates into better
outcomes, suggesting that justice is not equal under the law and that
lawyers’ monopoly does not function to promote the public good.132 As a
result, the fear that machine intelligence will undermine the ideological
foundations of lawyers’ monopoly is a very real one.
CONCLUSION
The market for electronic legal services is at a relatively early, yet
significant, stage in terms of the disruptive effect of machine intelligence in
undermining lawyers’ monopoly. As machine intelligence in lawyering
develops exponentially, it will take an increasingly larger role in five areas
of legal practice: discovery, legal search, generation of documents, creation
of briefs and memoranda, and predictive analytics. Eventually, machine
intelligence will prove faster and more efficient than many lawyers in
providing those services. Lawyers will continue to provide services that
cannot be commoditized if they are superstars, practice in highly
specialized areas of law subject to rapid change, appear in court, or provide
services where human relationships are central to their quality. Otherwise,
no effective barriers to the advance of machine lawyering in legal practices
exist—not even in the law and ethics of lawyering. Lawyers will continue
to embrace machine intelligence as an input and fail to prevent nonlawyers
from using it to deliver legal services. Ultimately, therefore, the disruptive
effect of machine intelligence will trigger the end of lawyers’ monopoly

130. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1229, 1238–40 (1995).
131. See id. at 1239–40; Russell G. Pearce & Sinna Nasseri, The Virtue of Low Barriers to
Becoming a Lawyer: Promoting Liberal and Democratic Values, 19 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF.
357, 365–66 (2012).
132. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers
Should Be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1084, 1112–13 (1983).
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and provide a benefit to society and clients as legal services become more
transparent and affordable to consumers, and access to justice thereby
becomes more widely available.

